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Abstract: In a context of higher reliance on irrigation schemes to ensure food 
security, it is crucial to understand institutional success of water resource man-
agement. In addition to other factors explored in great depth by the CPR lit-
erature, the actions of long-term appropriators contribute to the success of 
institutions. However, only a limited amount of work has attempted to exam-
ine the actual relationship between length of tenure and institutional success. To 
examine these relationships, we analyze a long-enduring CPR, the Mwea irriga-
tion scheme (MIS) in Kenya, a network created in the 1950s and whose appro-
priators have held different lengths of tenure. We explore payment of operation 
and maintenance (O&M) fees of 71 irrigation units over two consecutive years. 
We examine 422 household surveys in eight out of the 71 irrigation units on the 
practice of institutions. We find that length of tenure impacts institutional success 
by influencing the behaviors of appropriators. Appropriators with longer tenure 
promote institutional success by provisioning the resource in a more sustainable 
manner through achieving high payments of O&M fees. Relatively dissatisfied 
with the implementation of the rules, they use formal and informal means to 
criticize institutions and to promote institutional change and adaptation. In con-
trast, appropriators with shorter tenure achieve lower payments of O&M fees, 
they complain less, and are more satisfied with the existing implementation of 
the rules. They are satisfied with the status quo. Hence, it is through the pressure 
of experienced appropriators that institutions such as the MIS evolve and adapt 
to become more successful.
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1. Introduction
In a global context of climate change and increased water scarcity, the development 
of successful irrigation schemes in sub-Saharan Africa where rainfed agriculture 
still prevails could significantly support food security (Burney et al. 2013; Elliott 
et al. 2014). However, developing successful irrigation schemes is highly challeng-
ing. Policy makers and resource users must solve key collective action problems: 
they must acquire and manage the physical infrastructure necessary to utilize the 
resource; they must manage the resource sustainably; and they must cope with the 
asymmetric positions of the head-starters and the tail-enders (Janssen et al. 2011). 
Although there is no agreed-upon definition of what successful or sustainable gov-
ernance is, there is a common understanding that “successful institutions [are] 
those that last over time, constrain users to safeguard the resource, and produce 
fair outcomes” (Agrawal 2001). Successful institutions structure the appropriation 
and provisioning of the resource in order to achieve these objectives.1 This work 
builds on established literature on institutional success to enrich the narrative that 
links institutional success and appropriators’ lengths of tenure.
We ask how appropriators with various length of tenure frame institutional 
success. More specifically, we investigate how groups of farmers and individual 
appropriators with different lengths of tenure provision the resource and assess 
the implementation of the rules in place in the Mwea Irrigation Scheme (MIS) 
in Kenya. Created in 1953, the MIS is a long-enduring irrigation scheme whose 
institutions have greatly evolved over time to become more and more successful 
and whose appropriators have held differing lengths of tenure. This case study is 
ideally suited to analyze the distinct roles of appropriators with various lengths of 
tenure in shaping institutional success.
To answer our research question, we analyze scheme-wide payments of O&M 
fees in 71 irrigation units and household surveys on the perception of institutions 
conducted in eight out of the 71 irrigation units. We then discuss how this analysis 
enhances our understanding of the relationships between institutional success and 
length of tenure. Adding to our understanding of the general relationships between 
1
 Here, appropriation and provision are respectively understood following Ostrom (1990) as, on the 
one hand, “the process of withdrawing resources units from a resource system” and, on the other, as 
the amount of inputs required in the form of labor, material, or money to appropriate the resource.
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length of tenure and the success and adaptive capacity of institutions established by 
past literature, this paper provides a more complete image of the role of appropria-
tors with differing lengths of tenure. This work suggests that appropriators with 
longer tenure promote institutional success by provisioning and appropriating the 
resource in a sustainable manner. They also foster the adaptation of institutions by 
formally and informally mobilizing against institutional failures.
2. Literature review
Since the 1980s, a large body of research has explored the conditions needed 
for successful collective action and sustainable use of the resource in irrigation 
schemes and other common pool resources (CPRs). Researchers have shown that 
CPRs can be successfully governed, and have postulated conditions favoring suc-
cess in CPR management (Wade 1988; Ostrom 1990; Baland and Platteau 1996). 
One of the earliest and most influential was Ostrom’s eight “design principles” for 
the sustainable management of CPRs – research that led to much new empirical 
investigations and lab experiments on irrigation schemes (Ostrom 1990; Cole and 
McGinnis 2015). More recent work has emphasized the importance of ecological 
and technical infrastructure in addition to the original eight design principles in 
order to successfully govern CPRs (Agrawal 2001; Anderies et al. 2016; McCord 
et al. 2017b).
Theoretical, empirical, and experimental work has investigated relationships 
between long-enduring CPRs, successful and adaptive institutions, and the roles 
of appropriators. For North (2005), institutional success is primarily characterized 
by “adaptive efficiency” and the ability of governance actors to create institutions 
that are flexible over time. Ostrom (1990, 2001) asserts that the capacity of appro-
priators to mobilize past experiences and to both construct flexible institutions and 
adapt to new conditions characterize long-enduring institutions. Appropriators 
adapt and transform institutions over time to enhance success and adaptive capac-
ity (Greif 2014). This research all points to the important role of CPR appropria-
tors in allowing the resource to persist over time and the institutions to evolve and 
become more successful. Over time, it is the appropriators who shape the success 
of the institutions through a process of trial and error.
However, little research has been done on the role of appropriators with differ-
ent lengths of tenure in institutions governing CPRs. In fact, this factor is critical 
because crafting institutions is not a one-shot effort but is a long-term develop-
ment to which newcomers may be less proficient than appropriators with longer 
tenure. (Ostrom 1990; Lam 1998). New settlers can learn about and accept insti-
tutions over time, but they can also be disruptive and exacerbate conflicts over 
the resource (Ostrom 2001). Given the physical and institutional complexity of 
irrigation schemes, individual farmers need to learn how to appropriate and provi-
sion the resource successfully. As Lam (1998) summarizes it, “as time goes by, 
individuals in an irrigation system will settle in a working order that presumably 
will improve performance of the system”. Yet, to date, limited attention has been 
paid to the mechanics of individual and collective learning, to what happens “as 
332 Camille Washington-Ottombre and Tom P. Evans
time goes by.” In a context of rapid and exponential turnover of CPR appropria-
tors driven by migrations and the ongoing construction of irrigation infrastructure 
(Mandri-Perrot and Bisbey 2016), it is crucial to better understand the role that 
length of tenure plays in shaping mechanics influencing institutional success.
As discussed above, there is no agreed-upon definition or metrics of what 
constitutes successful institutions. However, a number of variables can be used as 
indicators of successful institutions that guarantee adequate provision and appro-
priation of the resource. Applied to irrigation schemes, successful institutions fos-
ter adequate provision of the resource by structuring adequate levels of payments 
of O&M fees and participation in communal work such as canal repairs. Payment 
of O&M fees is one of the crucial ways in which appropriators provision the 
resource and ensure appropriate access to water (Lankford 2012). Without appro-
priate payment of O&M fees, it is impossible to guarantee the sustainability of an 
irrigation scheme (Lam 1998). In other words, satisfactory levels of payment of 
O&M fees demonstrate, at least in part, the functioning of successful institutions.
Appropriators’ perception of institutions can also be used as a measure of 
institutional success. Their views on the institutions affects the appropriation of 
the resource and the overall success of the irrigation scheme (Small and Svendsen 
1990; Shivakotti 2002). Appropriators need to agree with and internalize the prac-
tice of the rules in order to contribute to the functioning of the institutions (Lam 
1998). Despite the important role of appropriators’ perception of the success and 
fairness of institutions in shaping sustainable CPR management, limited work has 
investigated farmers’ perspective on irrigation schemes. When assessing the per-
formance of irrigation schemes, appropriators’ assessments have in many cases 
been overlooked or only considered as a way to complement expert-based assess-
ments (Yakubov 2011). In the same ways that the variables described above can 
be used as proxies to measure institutional success, others have been highlighted 
by past literature as shaping institutional success.
Three main groups of characteristics contributing to institutional success have 
been highlighted by past literature: physical attributes and access to the resource, 
institutional and social attributes of the appropriators, and governance regimes at 
multiple scales of governance (Lam 2001). While multi-scale governance regimes 
are central to the sustainable governance of CPRs such as irrigation schemes, this 
paper focuses at the local level on the institutional and social attributes of resource 
appropriators and the resource’s physical attributes and accessibility.2
Physical attributes and suitable access to the resource influence payment 
of O&M and appropriators’ perception of success and fairness of institutions. 
Appropriators are more willing to invest in the CPR and perceive institutions 
more favorably when the resource is neither too abundant nor too scarce (Uphoff 
1986). They are satisfied with the institutions and provision the resource ade-
2
 Including recognition of local governance schemes by higher levels of governance and polycentric 
institutions, (Ostrom 1990). For a detailed investigation of how broader governance regimes have 
evolved and shaped local institutions in the MIS, see Baldwin et al. (2016).
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quately when there is a significant chance of getting a return back from the invest-
ment. The good condition of the resource, as well as the manageable size of the 
resource and predictability of water flows, encourages cooperation and proper 
governance (Lam 2001). Asymmetries in water allocation between head-starters 
and tail-enders in an irrigation scheme lead to spatial differences in provision 
of the resource that can impede cooperation and institutional success (Ostrom 
and Gardner 1993). The quality of the physical infrastructure for irrigation also 
defines provisioning of the resource and users’ satisfaction (Lam 2001; Kemerink 
et al. 2016; McCord et al. 2017b).
Institutional and social attributes of the appropriators also shape institutional 
success. Salience of the resource for appropriators largely defines institutional 
success (Agrawal 2001). Appropriators are more likely to invest in the difficult 
crafting of the rules if they are dependent on the resource for their livelihood. 
Sociocultural homogeneity among appropriators, trust and reciprocity, and a com-
mon understanding of how the resource should be managed enhance institutional 
success (Lam 2001; Ostrom 2001). When assets differ, appropriators with larger 
assets may be more willing to invest in shaping successful institutions (Shivakotti 
2002). Beyond heterogeneity of endowment, homogeneity of identities and inter-
ests are key in supporting long-enduring CPRs (Agrawal 2001).
Additional institutional and social attributes shape the capacity of appropria-
tors to provision and appropriate the resource in an adequate manner. First, the 
length of tenure of appropriators shapes the ways in which they provision the 
resource and assess the institutions in place (Ostrom 2001). Appropriators with 
a longer tenure have more practice with rules fundamental to the functioning of 
irrigation schemes, such as payment of O&M fees. In addition, appropriators who 
actively participate in institutions build up social capital and promote institutional 
success. Research shows that the number of community meetings attended by 
appropriators correlates positively with the state of the resource and institutional 
success (Agrawal and Yadama 1997). The opportunity to air grievances bolsters 
reciprocity norms and fosters institutional success by increasing the level of 
contact among appropriators (Ostrom 2005). Airing grievances or critiquing the 
implementation of institutions helps prevent violence in the same way conflict 
resolution mechanisms do. A system with a robust capacity for farmers to air 
grievances allows space for these kinds of discussions, which promote a spirit of 
democracy, dissipate frustration and anger, and promote institutional learning. In 
the same manner, the ability to informally complain and reach out to local leaders 
help deescalate conflicts and participate in the success of the CPR (Ostrom 2005).
3. Background information
3.1. The Mwea Irrigation Scheme: institutional changes and physical 
growth
The Mwea Irrigation Scheme (MIS), a CPR managed by appropriators with 
diverse levels of institutional experience, has a long and unique history of 
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 institutional changes and physical growth. The MIS is located on the eastern 
slopes of Mount Kenya, about 100 km northeast of Nairobi (Figure 1). The local 
climate is semiarid, with 300 to 500 mm of precipitation annually and both short 
and long rainy seasons. More than 80% of the rice consumed in Kenya originates 
from the Mwea area, which is the largest rice-growing area in East Africa. The 
Figure 1: Growth of the Mwea irrigation scheme.
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26,000 acres under irrigation are cultivated by over 7000 households. Households 
produce rice as a commodity that they sell on local markets. No other commod-
ity crops are cultivated. Irrigation water is used for rice production. Water for 
irrigation is extracted from the Nyamindi and Thiba rivers via gravity-fed intake 
weirs that distribute water throughout the scheme’s 71 irrigation units (National 
Irrigation Board 2018).
The institutions governing access to water for irrigation have changed con-
siderably over the course of the scheme’s history (Baldwin et al. 2016). The 
scheme was built by political detainees from the 1953 Mau Mau rebellion under 
British colonial rule (Elkins 2005). Under colonial rule, and after Kenya gained 
independence in the mid-1960s, large-scale irrigation schemes not only pro-
duced food and provided employment but were also used to allocate land to the 
growing landless population (Chambers 1969). The postcolonial government of 
Kenya embraced the top-down colonial approach to governance and created the 
National Irrigation Board (NIB) to administer irrigation schemes such as the MIS 
(Chambers and Morris 1973). Tenant farmers had little ability to amend scheme 
rules, appeal managers’ decisions, or otherwise provide input into scheme gover-
nance. When the NIB was in power, farmers lacked basic property rights and had 
to sell their agricultural products below market price to subsidize other irrigation 
schemes that were failing. They endured the scheme managers’ regular failure 
to monitor water use, sanction improper water use, and solve water use conflicts 
among tenants (Kenya Human Rights Commission 2000). The scheme managers’ 
comprehensive powers left farmers hamstrung and vulnerable, particularly during 
the frequent droughts of the 1980s and 1990s. During the 1997 drought, a violent 
farmers’ revolt to protest against the low buying price of rice put an end to the 
top-down rule of the NIB.
Since the 1997 revolt, the MIS has experienced significant institutional learn-
ing and change, which has resulted in a more sustainable institutional design 
(Baldwin et al. 2016). In the aftermath of the turmoil in Mwea, Kenya’s Ministry 
of Agriculture granted the Mwea Rice Grower Multipurpose (MRGM), a coop-
erative of farmers, sole management of the scheme. The first years of MRGM 
governance were relatively successful, with land preparation completed on sched-
ule for the first time in the scheme’s history and record rice prices of KSh. 30 
per kilogram in 2000 (The NIB offered only KSh. 18 per kilogram in 1998). 
However, farmers lacked the funds and technical knowledge necessary to main-
tain the scheme’s infrastructure. In 2003, in order to maintain rice production, the 
Mwea Water User Association (MWUA, formerly MRGM) and the NIB began to 
share management of the irrigation scheme, with the NIB handling infrastructure 
operation and maintenance (a task for which the tenant farmers were inadequately 
trained), while the farmers retained control over most day-to-day operations. 
Since 2003, relative peace and economic well-being have characterized the life 
of farmers in the MIS for the first time since the it was created in the late 1950s.
Mwea farmers are facing new challenges, however. Pressure on water 
resources posed by illegal abstractors, the projected physical expansion of the 
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scheme and construction of the Thiba mega dam, as well as aging infrastructure 
are threatening the status quo. In addition, new national water irrigation legisla-
tion implementing water user associations (WUAs) across the country and call-
ing for payment for water provision will soon be implemented in the MIS. This 
is likely to deeply impact local farmers and institutions (Baldwin et al. 2016; 
Dell’Angelo et al. 2016; Kemerink et al. 2016; McCord et al. 2017a; Baldwin 
et al. 2018).
Along with the institutional changes that have occurred over the years, the 
physical footprint of the scheme has expanded to reach its current size of 26,000 
acres under irrigation. Infrastructure development supported by international 
donors and the construction of artisanal canals by illegals abstractors both drove 
the expansion of the MIS. In 1959, the British built the Tebere section fed by 
the Nyamindi canal system, in 1960 they built the Thiba and Mwea sections 
along the Thiba canal system. With the financial support of the UK and West 
Germany, additions to the Thiba canal systems were made in 1963, 1969, and 
1970 to create the Karaba and Wamumu sections of the scheme. As the irri-
gation infrastructure was being built, farmers who legally owned land on the 
outskirts of the scheme started to illegally abstract water from the scheme’s 
canals and drains by building their own canals to irrigate their fields (Serede 
et al. 2014). After 1998, those farmers, called “out-growers” by those within 
the scheme, joined the scheme and formed the Curukia and Ndekia sections. 
In 2012, other out-growers in the Kiamaneyki section joined the scheme and 
became a part of the Thiba canal system. In a similar process in 2013, K9 joined 
the Karaba section. At the time the data presented here were collected, other 
groups of out-growers were negotiating to join the scheme. The construction of 
a new Thiba dam will lead to a significant physical expansion of the scheme in 
the near future.
Current institutional practices reflect a mix of top-down and bottom-up 
arrangements, in which the MWUA and the NIB share the governance of 
the scheme. The MWUA is primarily in charge of collecting the O&M fees, 
performing the day-to-day maintenance of the facilities, setting up irrigation 
and cropping schedules, and guaranteeing the daily operation of the MIS. 
On the other hand, the NIB is responsible for major maintenance and expan-
sion projects. The NIB also provides technical expertise to the MWUA for 
setting irrigation and cropping schedules, as well as monitoring the state of 
the MIS. Elected MWUA executive committee members, NIB managers, and 
branch canal representatives together form the water management committee. 
The water management committee regulates, plans, controls, and administers 
the irrigation process. As such, the committee allocates irrigation groups that 
define when irrigation units will be receiving water each year. The executive 
committee also organizes a general assembly monthly during the irrigation 
season and holds annual general body meetings where general policy matters 
are discussed, funds for O&M are allocated, and the annual budget and audit 
of accounts are approved. Meetings are held before and during the  cropping 
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season to prepare cropping plans and plan the water budget, maintenance 
schedule, and infrastructure repairs. Executive committee members are also 
members of the advisory dispute subcommittee, along with the manager of the 
NIB, the district commissions of Mwea East and Mwea West, senior scheme 
managers, local chiefs, and farmers’ representatives.
In order to farm and irrigate their fields, MWUA members must meet different 
sets of obligations depending on their land ownership status. MWUA members 
who are tenants on NIB land must pay a one-time membership fee as well as 
annual operation and maintenance (O&M) fees proportional to the amount of land 
they irrigate. Members in the out-grower areas also pay a one-time membership 
fee, but they maintain their own canals and therefore do not pay the same O&M 
fees as the NIB tenants do. Each MWUA member belongs to an irrigation unit. To 
receive water for irrigation, each unit must reach 60% of the required O&M pay-
ment. All members are required to pay a one-time membership fee to the MWUA. 
Members are also required to use irrigation water efficiently, participate in com-
munal work on irrigation and drainage systems, follow the cropping program, and 
attend MWUA and unit meetings. Members have the right to be consulted about 
the maintenance and cropping programs. They also elect members of the execu-
tive committee and leaders at the branch level.
3.2. Case study sites
Eight irrigation units within the MWUA were selected because they vary in terms 
of length of tenure, access to water, size, and challenges faced by the appropria-
tors. The selected irrigation units represent a wide array of situations relative to 
length of tenure and access to water. Three of the units are on NIB land and 
have long tenure and practice: T13, M15/16, and W6. T13 is a 190-acre irriga-
tion unit that is part of the original Tebere river irrigation system, which was built 
between 1954 and 1959. It has good access to water because it occupies the third 
position on the main Nyamindi canal. When the unit was created in 1959, each 
tenant was given four acres of land. At the time of data collection some four-acre 
parcels were still farmed by the original tenants, but most parcels had been subdi-
vided into smaller parcels farmed by the descendants of the original tenants. This 
has led to increased pressure on the land and conflicts around issues of inheri-
tance. The next unit, M15/16, has a significantly different profile. It is a 96-acre 
irrigation unit created in 1964 on the Thiba’s main canal in the Tebere section. 
M15/16 is located at the end of the Thiba’s main canal, downstream from several 
units. The original small units of M15 and M16 decided to merge to have more 
influence over the allocation of water when the MWUA took over the manage-
ment of the scheme in the late 1990s. However, disputes over water allocation and 
land subdivision still plague farming in the unit. Finally, W6 was built in 1970 and 
extracts water from the Thiba Branch Canal IV. It is a small unit of 59 acres that 
occupies the antepenultimate position on the branch canal and periodically lacks 
access to water due to its downstream location. Disputes over land subdivision are 
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frequent. The unit also suffers from illegal abstraction of water by descendants of 
the original tenants who farm on the outskirts of the unit.
The next three units were formed when out-growers joined the scheme in the 
aftermath of the 1997 riots: Ndekia III, Cumbiri II, and Ng’othi. Ndekia III is a 200-
acre unit where farmers own their land and created their own water user association 
in the 1980s to abstract water from the Nyamindi link canal via an artisanal canal 
system that they built. They are in the third position on the canal and benefit from 
an adequate amount of water. Cumbiri II is a large unit of 424 acres where farmers 
had started abstracting water from the drain of the Thiba section in the 1980s. They 
are the last abstractors on the drain and therefore often face water scarcity. Ng’othi 
also joined in 1998 and is a smaller unit of 98 acres. They are downstream of most 
units on the Nyamindi section and also often face water scarcity. 
The final two units joined very recently or were in the process of joining 
the scheme at the time of data collection: Kiamaneyki and K9. Kiamaneyki is 
a large unit of 800 acres that officially joined the scheme in 2012. The residents 
there started building their own canals in 1985 to get water from the drainage of 
T20. Since they became MWUA members, they now extract water from the Thiba 
Rumble Weir and thus have more reliable access to water. Finally, K9 started to 
develop irrigation canals in 1999 after having illegally farmed 110 undeveloped 
acres of NIB land in the aftermath of the 1997 riots. They crafted artisanal canals 
and created their own WUA. They abstract water from the Thiba branch canal and 
rarely face water scarcity. However, their location in a lower elevation area makes 
them vulnerable to floods. At the time of data collection, they had just joined the 
MWUA in order to gain more reliable access to water and were still contributing 
O&M to their own informal WUA. 
4. Methods
Data was collected both at the scale of all the 71 irrigation units of the MIS to 
assess dynamics at the collective level and at the scale of individual households in 
a subset of 8 units to assess dynamics at the individual level.
4.1. Relationships between institutional success and length of tenure at the 
unit level
Data collected in the 71 irrigation units was used to assess relationships between 
length of tenure and institutional success at the unit level (Tables 1 and 2). We 
used percentage of payment of operation and maintenance (O&M) fees as an indi-
cator of institutional success at the unit level. As indicated above, in order to have 
access to water for irrigation, each unit must reach 60% of the required O&M 
payment, meaning that 60% of the tenants or land-owners in each unit must pay 
O&M fees. We collected data relative to the percentage of payment of O&M 
fees for 71 irrigation units for the 2011 and 2012 cropping seasons. Data was 
collected at the MWUA’s offices on the scheme. 2011’s cropping season was suc-
cessful throughout the MIS. In contrast, the 2012 cropping season was disrupted 
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by repairs conducted on the main canal of the Tebere section. Percentage of pay-
ment of O&M fees is treated as the outcome variable.
Other variables that measure physical attributes and access to the resource as 
well as institutional and social attributes of the appropriators are treated as covari-
ates. To measure physical attributes and access to the resource of the different 
units, we collected data on the size (in acres) of the irrigation units and the order in 
which units receive water during the cropping season (water is allocated by irriga-
tion group, with group 1 being allocated water first and group 4 being  allocated 
water last). To measure institutional and social attributes, we collected data rela-
tive to the length of tenure measured both in terms of the date at which units 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for irrigation units.
 Mean (SD) or No. (%)
Outcomes
 Paid O&M 2011 (%)  79.5 (19)
 Paid O&M 2012 (%)  76.9 (16.6)
Covariates
 Year of membership  1969.6 (13.9)
 Acres irrigated  268.4 (136.4)
 Irrigation group
  1  35 (49.3%)
  2  21 (29.6%)
  3  4 (5.6%)
  4  11 (15.5%)
 Location
  Nyamindi  17 (23.6%)
  Thiba  45 (62.5%)
  Curukia  6 (8.3%)
  Ndekia  4 (5.6%)
Table 2: ANOVA for 2011 and 2012 operation and maintenance fee payment.
 
 
O&M 2011  
 
O&M 2012
Mean (SD)  p-Value Mean (SD)  p-Value
Irrigation Group  <0.001   0.325
 1  87.7 (13.4)   80.5 (13.8)  
 2  78.3 (16.8)   73.5 (14.3)  
 3  84.2 (19.1)   76.5 (15.6)  
 4  56.5 (19.7)   72 (26.4)  
Location   <0.001   0.27
 Nyamindi  79 (15.6)   69.8 (13.2)  
 Thiba  84.7 (16.2)   79.3 (16.4)  
 Curukia  53.2 (19)   78.7 (17.1)  
 Ndekia  63 (24.5)   75.7 (26.8)  
Note: p Values were obtained using ANOVA.
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joined the MIS and the location on the scheme, since the historical expansion of 
the scheme is highly interconnected with its physical expansion. Both variables 
are used interchangeably as measures of length of tenure but their role in shaping 
payment of O&M fees is measured differently since the first is a continuous vari-
able whereas the second is a categorical variable.
We first compute descriptive statistics for percent of payment of O&M fees 
and covariates. Percent of payment of O&M fees, the outcome variable, is used as 
a proxy of institutional success. Year of membership, number of acres irrigated, 
irrigation group, and location on the schemes are used as covariates to measure 
physical and social attributes (Table 1). Then, we explore simple relationships 
between the covariates and the outcomes using ANOVA for categorical predictors 
and t-tests for continuous predictors. We discuss tests for homogeneity of variance 
as well as results from post hoc testing. Finally, we test multiple linear regression 
models for percentage of O&M payment in 2011 and 2012 to determine the effect 
of each predictor after controlling for the others (Table 3).
4.2. Relationships between institutional success and length of tenure at the 
appropriators’ level
422 household surveys located in 8 units were analyzed in order to assess the 
relationships between length of tenure and institutional success at the appropria-
tors’ level (Figure 1). Households surveyed were selected to represent a variety of 
positions from head-starters, to tail-enders and to farms in between. Semi-directed 
interviews were conducted by enumerators in English or in the local vernacular 
language. We measured appropriators’ satisfaction with the rules in place to gov-
ern access to membership, land, and water as indicators of institutional success at 
the level of the appropriators (Tables 4 and 5).
Table 3: Multiple linear regression model for 2011 and 2012 operation and maintenance fee 
payments.
 
 
O&M 2011  
 
O&M 2012
Coefficient SE  p-Value Coefficient  SE  p-Value
Intercept  −46.96  960.09  0.961  −129.31  866.73  0.882
Year of membership  0.07  0.49  0.891  0.1  0.44  0.814
Acres irrigated  −0.01  0.02  0.707  −0.02  0.02  0.298
Irrigation Group
 2  −9.32  4.65  0.049  −6.7  4.2  0.115
 3  −4.6  8.81  0.603  −5.89  7.95  0.462
 4  −38.34  25.52  0.138  −61.23  23.04  0.01
Location
 Thiba  6.03  5.7  0.295  12.52  5.15  0.018
 Curukia  6.84  19.1  0.722  67.35  17.25  <0.001
 Ndekia  15.9  20.35  0.438  62.5  18.37  0.001
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Table 4: Household survey results.
Mean (SD) or No. (%)
Outcomes
 Membership rules are well implemented
  Strongly disagree 25 (6.6%)
  Disagree 23 (6. %)
  Neutral 6 (1.6%)
  Agree 23 (6. %)
  Strongly agree 304 (79.8%)
 Rules that govern access to land are well implemented
  Strongly disagree 7 (1.8%)
  Disagree 5 (1.3%)
  Neutral 1 (0.3%)
  Agree 8 (2.1%)
  Strongly agree 363 (94.5%)
 Rules that govern access to water are well implemented
  Strongly disagree 19 (4.9%)
  Disagree 23 (5.9%)
  Neutral 4 (1%)
  Agree 25 (6.4%)
  Strongly agree 317 (81.7%)
Covariates
 Household size 4.05 (1.9)
 Number of acres under irrigation 2.07 (2.9)
 Years of membership to the MIS 14.67 (14.3)
 Unit number
  Cumbiri II 45 (11.4%)
  K9 57 (14.5%)
  KIA 49 (12.5%)
  M16 50 (12.7%)
  Ndekia III 50 (12.7%)
  Ng’othi 42 (10.7%)
  T13 50 (12.7%)
  W6 50 (12.7%)
 Amount of income from farming
  All 232 (59%)
  Most 135 (34.3%)
  Some 19 (4.8%)
  Little 5 (1.3%)
  None 2 (0.5%)
 Farmed here entire life
  Yes 241 (61.5%)
  No 151 (38.5%)
 Dispute in the past year
  No 347 (89.2%)
  Yes 42 (10.8%)
 Aired a grievance in the past year
  No 91 (23.3%)
  Yes 300 (76.7%)
  If yes, number of grievances aired 2.48 (2.9)
 Attended a meeting in the past year
  No 54 (13.8%)
  Yes 337 (86.2%)
  If yes, number of meetings attended 3.04 (3.3)
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Other variables that measure physical attributes and access to the resource as 
well as community and social attributes of the appropriators are treated as covari-
ates. To measure physical attributes and access to the resource of the appropriators, 
we collected data on the number of acres farmed on irrigated MIS land. To measure 
social attributes of the appropriators, we collected data relative to the size of the 
household, years of membership to the MIS, proportion of the household’s income 
derived from farming on irrigated MIS land, and local collective action. For data in 
this last category, heads of household were asked if they had aired grievances about 
the MIS to neighbors or friends in the past year and at what frequency. They were 
also asked if they had participated in community meetings in the past year and at 
what frequency, and if they had experienced disputes over land or water in the past 
year and at what frequency. Finally, they were asked if they had contacted lead-
ers to discuss both land and water-related issues at different scales of governance 
(local leader, Chief, Member of Parliament), and at what frequency.
Summary statistics of all variables are displayed below, including counts and 
percentages for categorical variables and means and standard deviations for con-
tinuous variables. Because the distribution of the outcome variables is skewed, 
with most observations falling in the “strongly agree” category, we recoded them 
such that “strongly disagree” and “agree” were collapsed into a single category. 
Similarly, for the income variable, “some”, “most”, and “all” are collapsed into a 
single category. Finally, we perform a logistic regression Wald’s test for continu-
ous covariates and a chi-square test for the categorical variables to assess their 
impact on the outcome variable. Appropriators’ satisfaction with rules relative 
to membership as well as water and land allocation, the outcome variables, are 
used as a proxy of institutional success. Household size, number of acres under 
irrigation, unit number, amount of income from farming, lengths of farming on 
the MIS, occurrence of a disputes, airing of grievances, attendance of meetings, 
and contact of a local leader are used as covariates to measure physical and social 
attributes (Table 5).
Mean (SD) or No. (%)
 Contacted a unit leader in the past year
  No 50 (12.8%)
  Yes 341 (87.2%)
 Contacted a chief in the past year
  No 240 (61.4%)
  Yes 151 (38.6%)
 Contacted a member of parliament in the past year
  No 379 (96.9%)
  Yes 12 (3.1%)
  If yes, number of times contacting leader/chief/parliament 4.03 (4.5)
Table 4 (continued)
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5. Results
5.1. Relationships between institutional success and length of tenure at the 
unit level
The analysis of the data collected at the level of the 71 units shows that payment of 
O&M fees in 2011 is slightly higher (mean=79.5) than it is in 2012 (mean=76.9) 
(Table 1). On average, the size of irrigated land in each unit is 268.4 with a stan-
dard deviation of 136.4. Most survey respondents are in irrigation group 1 (49.3%) 
with the remainder in group 2 (29.6%), group 4 (15.5%), and group 3 (5.6%). The 
majority of respondents are located in the Thiba section (62.5%), followed by the 
Nyamindi (23.6%), Curukia (8.3%), and Ndekia (5.6%) sections.
The ANOVA models for the 2011 and 2012 payment of O&M fees reveal that 
both categorical variables (irrigation group number and location) are significant 
in the 2011 O&M model whereas none are significant in the 2012 O&M model 
(Table 2). Bartlett’s test of equal variance did not reject the null hypothesis of 
homogeneity for either variable in 2011. The test was also not significant for 
location in 2012, but it was significant for irrigation group number in 2011, 
p=0.04. A Kruskal-Wallis test confirmed the non-significance of irrigation group 
number for the 2012 data. Boxplots (not shown) did not identify any concerning 
outliers.
Irrigation group number is significantly related to the payment of 2011 O&M 
fees (p<0.001). Post hoc pairwise comparisons using Tukey’s HSD adjustment for 
multiple comparisons found that group 4 was significantly different from group 
1 (p<0.001), group 2 (p=0.002), and group 3 (p=0.018). The remaining pairwise 
comparisons were not significant. Location is also important (p<0.001). In this 
model, location is used as a proxy for length of tenure given the development of 
the physical expansion of the scheme over time. Post hoc pairwise comparisons 
using Tukey’s HSD method found that the mean difference between Curukia and 
Nyamini was significant (p=0.010), as was the difference between Curukia and 
Thiba (p<0.001). The other pairwise comparisons were not significant. In con-
trast, neither irrigation group number nor location is significantly related to the 
payment of 2012 O&M fees. Mean payments range from 72 to 80.5 for the four 
irrigation groups and from 69.8 to 79.3 for the four irrigation sections.
T-tests reveal a slight negative relationship between unit size and 2011 pay-
ments (p=0.048); with larger units making smaller O&M payments. There also 
appears to be a negative trend between year joined and payment amount, which 
suggests that those who joined later made smaller payments. This relationship is 
significant (p<0.001). Similarly, irrigation unit size is negatively correlated with 
2012 payments (p=0.002): higher land size corresponds to lower payments. There 
is no statistically significant relationship between year joined and 2012 payments 
even though units with more length of tenure in the Thiba section achieved a 
higher percentage of payment of O&M fees than those in Curukia and Ndekia. 
Units in Nyamindi paid a lower percentage of O&M fees in 2012 due to canal 
repairs disrupting access to water during the cropping season.
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A multiple linear regression model for the payments of 2011 O&M fees 
shows that group 2 made significantly lower payments than did group 1 (p=0.049; 
Table 3), though no pairwise comparisons are significant in post hoc analysis 
based on the model’s marginal means. No other variables are statistically signifi-
cant within the model. Changing the baseline group used for the location variable 
did not produce any significant results.
The multiple linear regression model for the payments of 2012 O&M fees shows 
that group 4 has a statistically significant coefficient, with those in group 4 making 
significantly smaller payments than those in group 1 (p=0.01). Post hoc pairwise 
comparisons based on the model’s estimated marginal means did not find other 
significant differences after a Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons. In 
addition, Thiba (p=0.018), Curukia (p<0.001), and Ndekia (p=0.001) sections made 
significantly higher payments than did the Nyamindi section. A post hoc analysis of 
Bonferroni pairwise comparisons based on the model’s estimated marginal means 
also found a significant difference between Curukia and Thiba (p=0.914). The dif-
ference between Ndekia and Thiba was right at the cut-off for significance (p=0.05).
5.2. Relationships between institutional success and length of tenure at the 
level of the appropriators
The household survey conducted in a subset of 8 units reveals that most appro-
priators strongly agree that membership rules (79.8%), as well as rules that govern 
access to land (94.5%) and to water (81.7%) are well implemented (Table 4). 
The average household size is 4 persons. Respondents farm an average 2.07 
acres of irrigated land and have been MIS members for an average of 14.7 years. 
Household survey respondents are evenly spread among the eight irrigation units. 
Most households (93.4%) receive all or most of their income from farming irri-
gated land. A majority of heads of household (61.5%) have farmed their current 
fields for their entire life. Most households (76.7%) have aired a grievance in 
the past year (about three times per year on average), but only a few (10.8%) 
have been involved in a dispute. The majority of heads of household (86.2%) 
have attended about three community meetings in the past year. Most heads of 
household have contacted a local leader in the past year (87.2%), but fewer have 
contacted the Chief (38.6%) or a Member of Parliament (3.1%).
The results of the logistic regression Wald’s test for continuous covariates 
and chi-square test for the categorical variables show that whether respondents 
believe that membership rules are well implemented is significantly correlated 
with unit number (p=0.014; Table 5). Appropriators in the Ng’othi (92.9%), 
Cumbiri 2 (86.7%), and K9 (85.7%) units are most likely to answer “strongly 
agree”, while those in the T13 unit are the least likely (63.3%). All other variables 
are insignificant at the 5% level.
Similarly, whether respondents believe that rules governing access to land are 
well implemented is highly significantly correlated with unit number (p=0.001). 
A vast majority of appropriators in the Ng’othi (100%), K9 (98.1%), Kiamaneyki 
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(97.9%), Cumbiri II (97.7%) units are most likely to answer “strongly agree”, 
while those in the T13 unit are the least likely (81.2%). Whether or not the indi-
vidual has aired a grievance (p=0.041) and the number of grievances (p=0.015) 
that they have aired in the past year is significantly negatively related to this out-
come, with those who report airing grievances being less likely to strongly agree. 
Number of meetings attended is negatively related to this outcome (p=0.028); 
those who responded “strongly agree” average three meetings while those who did 
not respond “strongly agree” had attended an average of five meetings. Household 
size is also significantly related (p=0.004), with those in larger households being 
less likely to agree that land access rules are well implemented.
Once again, whether respondents believe that rules governing access to 
water are well implemented is highly correlated with unit number (p=0.005). 
Appropriators in the Cumbiri 2 (93.2%) and the Ng’othi (92.9%) units are most 
likely to answer “strongly agree”, while those in the M15/16 (70%), T13 (72%), 
and Kiamaneyki (72.9%) unit are the least likely. Whether or not the individ-
ual has farmed there their entire life is also significantly related to this outcome 
(p=0.012). Those who had farmed there their entire life are less likely to strongly 
agree that the rules governing access to water are well implemented.
6. Discussion
Our work shows that units with longer lengths of tenure provision the resource 
with high payments of O&M fees, thereby contributing to institutional success. 
In units that joined the MIS early on, appropriators contribute to the payment of 
O&M fees largely beyond the required 60%. In contrast, appropriators in irriga-
tion units that joined the scheme later on, in particular those who joined after 
1998, make slightly lower payments of O&M fees while still reaching the mini-
mum required 60% of payment of O&M fees. This suggests that appropriators 
with a long tenure on the MIS have had the opportunity to learn to provision the 
resource not only adequately but beyond the minimum requirement (Lam 1998). 
By doing so they create and preserve a good reputation and position in the scheme 
(Megyesi 2016). Less experienced appropriators may have yet to fully measure 
the importance of creating and preserving a good reputation in the scheme in 
order to guaranty a good position in the cropping schedule and a more reliable 
access to water. Units that joined the MIS later on are also larger. Unit leaders 
may struggle to mobilize appropriators to achieve high percentages of O&M fees 
payments. They may need more time to foster collective action and provision the 
resource with high percentages of payments of O&M fees (Ostrom 2001).
In a manner that is consistent with past literature, this study shows that ade-
quate access to the resource impacts institutional success. Indeed, access to the 
resource early on and in a reliable manner significantly defined rate of O&M 
fees payment in 2011. Units in irrigation groups that received water early on 
in the cropping season were more likely to achieve higher payments of O&M 
fees because appropriators knew that they would have satisfactory access to the 
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resource. However, when adequate access is not achieved, units appear to achieve 
lower rates of O&M fee payments. In 2012, the poor condition of the main canal 
in the Nyamindi section may explain the lower payment of O&M fees there. This 
result emphasizes the importance of proper infrastructure and ecological condi-
tions in the smooth functioning of institutions (Anderies et al. 2016).
Although appropriators with longer lengths of tenure tend to better provision 
the resource, they are also more critical of the rules in place. Indeed, heads of 
household in older units as well as those with larger households and more mouths 
to feed are less satisfied with the implementation of rules relative to membership, 
land allocation, and water distribution than were those in units that joined the MIS 
more recently. In 2012, more experienced units withheld payment of O&M fees as 
a form of protest against the poor management of the canal repairs by the MWUA 
and the NIB. Households that had joined the MIS more recently were still enthusi-
astic about the scheme and experienced an improvement in their quality of life and 
farming practices. This is a phenomenon that has been observed in other surveys 
of farmers who had recently joined a WUA (Koç et al. 2006). Similarly, heads of 
household who had farmed in the MIS or adjoining land their entire life were less 
satisfied than others who had previously farmed elsewhere or had a different occu-
pation. Not only were they less satisfied with the implementation of fundamental 
rules, they were more likely to air grievances, to reach out to their leaders, and to 
attend meetings to discuss the nature and the implementation of local institutions. 
They more fully used the variety of formal and informal institutions in place to 
discuss what they viewed as institutional deficiencies (Ostrom 1990).
Taken together, these results compose a more complex picture of the rela-
tionship between appropriators’ length of tenure and institutional success as well 
as institutional capacity for adaptation (Mutambara et al. 2016; Romano 2017). 
Adding to our current knowledge of the general relationship between length 
of tenure and the adaptive capacity of institutions, this work provides a more 
complete image of the role of appropriators with different lengths of tenure. 
Appropriators with longer tenure promote institutional success by provisioning 
and appropriating the resource in a sustainable manner. They also foster the adap-
tation of institutions by formally and informally mobilizing a wide array of means 
of protest against institutional failures. By airing grievances, participating in com-
munity meetings, and contacting community leaders, experienced appropriators 
support the adaptive capacity of local institutions. Institutions must change with 
the times, and even stable institutions continue to improve under the pressure of 
appropriators with long tenure while appropriators with shorter tenure learn to 
practice local institutions.
7. Conclusion
This work expands upon existing literature on institutional success by analyz-
ing the role of appropriators’ length of tenure in shaping institutional success 
in CPR situations. In addition to other factors first explored by the seminal 
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works of Wade (1988), Ostrom (1990), and Baland and Platteau (1996) and later 
studied in great depth in the CPR literature, appropriators’ length of tenure con-
tributes to the success of local institutions However, a limited amount of work 
has explored what happens “as time goes by” and how length of tenure impacts 
institutional success. This work explores what happens “as time goes by” in 
an irrigation scheme where appropriators have very distinct lengths of tenure. 
To answer our research question, we conducted our analysis in the Mwea irriga-
tion scheme (MIS) in Kenya, an irrigation scheme that has expanded over time 
since the 1950s and were appropriators have different lengths of tenure. We 
analyzed payment of operation and maintenance (O&M) fees for 71 irrigation 
units over two consecutive years. We also examined the results of 422 house-
hold surveys on the practice of institutions conducted in eight irrigation units 
with distinct lengths of tenure.
This work suggests that “as time goes by” and as appropriators have a longer 
tenure in local institutions, their behavior and perceptions evolve. Appropriators 
with longer tenure promote institutional success by provisioning and appropriat-
ing the resource in a sustainable manner by achieving high payments of O&M 
fees. Their relative dissatisfaction with the implementation of the rules and their 
high reliance on formal and informal ways to complain and criticize institutions 
promotes institutional change and adaptation (Ostrom 2005). In contrast, appro-
priators with shorter tenure achieve lower payments of O&M fees, they complain 
less, and are more satisfied with the implementation of the rules. They are satis-
fied with the status quo.
Hence, at the level of the irrigation scheme, it is the appropriators with a 
longer tenure who foster the adaptation of institutions by formally and informally 
protesting against institutional weaknesses and failures while complying with the 
rules in place. In the history of the MIS, this process of complaining and protest-
ing is part of the successful continuation of this institution. Relative dissatisfaction 
is tied to the entitlement of appropriators with long tenure whose contributions 
well above 60% adequately provision the resource. Success does not mean that 
everyone is happy but that people appropriate and provision the resource and use 
means of protest to exercise their entitlement. It is under the pressure of these 
experienced appropriators that institutions can evolve and adapt to become more 
successful (Mutambara et al. 2016; Romano 2017).
This research indicates that analyzing the individual profiles of appropriators 
can help illuminate the details of institutional dynamics within a CPR. As with 
all survey-based research, there is a risk that respondents were answering in a 
socially desirable way to the questions about satisfaction with the institutions. 
To alleviate such biases and deepen this analysis, future work should aim at con-
ducting a longitudinal study over a long period of time, using both surveys and 
more in-depth interviews. Studies should continue to explore the role of different 
appropriators by analyzing for instance how age or gender affects the behavior of 
appropriators as well as collective outcomes.
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In a context of increased water scarcity, irrigation schemes governed by 
WUAs can support the rationalization of water use and improve food security. As 
this research suggests, they can only accomplish these objectives if farmers are 
deeply involved in local institutions, not only to correctly appropriate and provi-
sion the resource but also to critique the rules in place and promote the adaptation 
of institutions. 
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